Democratic Tension and the Australian Electoral System

The illusion of democracy is that it presents us with distinct choices; it does not. There will always be a ruling class which excludes the alternative options enough to limit the range of choices so as to render the impact of choice negligible. The only the complete absence of political parties could ensure genuine choice, but that is an impossibility. Human beings have always grouped together for mutual benefit; tribalism has many forms, from the primitive, to the symbolic, to the political. The essence of democracy is the contest between at least two tribes or partisan groups amongst the ruling class.

One might argue, then, that the ideal state, the state that most approximates the diversity of choice, is a multiparty system. This raises the problem of the tension between stability and diversity. In the absence of genuine choice, democracy resonates with the tension between the stability of governance and the diversity of representation. Multiparty democracies are notoriously unstable, while two-party democracies are notoriously fickle and stifling of difference. In the case of the former, governing alliances risk being undermined by fatal compromise between its participants (fatal, at least, to one of the parties), while the latter often promotes homogeneity, stifling internal dissent for the sake of stability.

There is no ideal circumstance in which parties or politicians come to power where human beings are concerned. At best, we can hope to manage the competing interests of the parties and the tributary groups they primarily represent through keeping them in a perpetual state of tension. In multiparty democracies, such tension is problematic because it may prove to be in a particular party's interest not to engage or compromise with other parties, thereby causing instability in the ever-fragile democratic state. In the two-party system it is almost mandatory not to engage or compromise with the only other competitor in the hope of gaining an outright majority (thereby rendering compromise unnecessary).

Whatever the system, an element of risk must be involved. Democracy is inherently risky; political parties must risk their enduring success, while the nation itself must risk social cohesion for the sake of democratic freedom. The U.S. electoral system represents the worst kind of two-party system, while many European nations, such as Greece, highlight the problems with a multiparty democracy. The U.S. system is moribund, remaining essentially unchanged for more than two centuries; the intransigence of the two major parties is entrenched, and, arguably, representative of a broader social divide in that country. Greece's electoral system is unwieldy, and often results in unstable governing coalitions, a pattern frequently repeated across Europe. Such irregular governance, it can be argued, has contributed to the economic instability of European nations, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. This, obviously, is a far more complex point than my over-simplification.

The Australian electoral system, I believe, manages to navigate the pitfalls of either extreme relatively well - relatively well. Our system has evolved since Federation, usually with bipartisan and popular support. We have a House of Representatives elected along the lines of the Westminster tradition, as single-member electorates, while our Senate is elected proportionally, as multi-member electorates. Our Senators, furthermore, are elected to "double terms," twice as long as the term of an MP in the Lower House. The particulars of the electoral methods employed can, indeed, be debated, but what is important is the difference in the way the houses are constituted.

In the U.S. the two Houses of Congress are elected in roughly the same manner, with a few variations. Senators there are elected in a similar manner to Congressmen, with two exceptions. First, Senators serve a six-year term, not a two-year term. Second, there are two Senators per state, although Senators from the same state are never elected simultaneously, except in rare occurrences where there is a casual vacancy and the law in that particular state dictates a "special election" to fill the position (usually, casual vacancies are filled at the Governor's discretion). The Senate and the House tend to resemble each other, with the Senate "swinging" a little more slowly than the House from one side to the other.

As is evident, the U.S. Congress is ineffective, partly because of how it is constituted. There are two-parties, and there is no real impetus for compromise; they can just play games and wait for their turn in government. The U.S. Government has, in fact, closed down more than once because of the intransigence between the various arms of government. There is no mechanism for resolving deadlock within Congress, or between Congress and the White House. The two major parties in the U.S. never have to really risk anything; the only thing at stake is who controls the Treasury, and eventually voters get tired of the governing party and just want a change - sometimes "it's time" and there isn't much you can do about it.

The same kind of inertia does exist, to an extent, in Australia. We have two parties who swap seats every now and then. Our system does, however, allow for alternative parties to make their case. There is a rich history of minor political parties changing the political landscape in this country. I have discussed them to some degree here. Even minor political parties that didn't quite take off have been able to influence the discourse. The possibility of winning seats in the Senate (even in the Legislative Councils of a number of states) is enough to promote the third-party alternative.

While most third-parties never win seats, their presence is central to maintaining the democratic tension in our electoral system. Third-parties pose a threat to the major parties. Both major parties have their voting blocs splintered, or threatened with such, from time to time. At present, the Labor vote is effectively splintered by the Greens, although with compulsory preferential voting the worst effects of this are mitigated. Both major parties have, in the past, been splintered from within, but both remain threatened from without as well. Whatever one may think of Bob Brown, Bob Katter, Pauline Hanson, or even Clive Palmer, they represent the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, of the threat the hegemony of the two major parties. Whether their disruptive politics can endure, however, is a different question. Hanson's rise and fall is a case in point.

Other parties, such as the Australian Sex Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, even the Wikileaks Party, represent the vibrant anti-incumbency that our system both enables and needs to maintain the tension. One may cast these minor players aside as "atmosphere," contributing colour and movement to the main game, but it is dangerous to be so flippant, given our political history. What is more, roughly one in five voters vote for a minor party in the Senate; in 2010, that rose to almost 30%, whether this "peak" is repeated at the next election is debatable.

It isn't just the major parties that are "at risk," if that's even the right term. Minor parties are, almost by definition, always at risk, and never more so than when they achieve political success. The balance of power in the Senate is a powerful but perilous position; in its 60-odd year history, it has seen off two "major" minor parties who attained to its influence. The DLP and the Democrats were both punished for their perceived indiscretions while holding the balance. What is perilous for minor parties like these when they do attain a level of influence is that they are more vulnerable to the consequences of compromise. The Democrats, for instance, suffered greatly for negotiating with the Howard Coalition government on the GST. The DLP were obliterated in 1974 for their intransigence towards the Whitlam government. It is hard to say if the Greens will suffer a similar fate to their predecessors. Minor parties are not as robust as their major counterparts. Put simply, they have no base that will vote for them no matter what they do - this may be the exception that saves the Greens, only time will tell.

What will be interesting about the upcoming election will be the influence of some of the more high-profile minor parties (mentioned above). I suspect that the third-party vote will exceed 25%, at least on the Senate ballot. With two deeply unpopular leaders, and two political parties that are descending to cartel-status, the upcoming election will actually be a test of voters' political comprehension, as well as of their willingness to act on their diminishing perception of the two major parties. There's no point complaining about the Big Two if you aren't willing to put your vote on the line. Labor and the Coalition will only respond to voter disaffection if there is a risk of losing those voters. The forthcoming election is not so much a test of the two leaders - neither is wanted - but rather a test of voters and the tensile strength of our democracy.